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Memory modification technologies (MMTs)—interventions within the memory af-
fecting its functions and contents in specific ways—raise great therapeutic hopes but
also great fears. Ethicists have expressed concerns that developing and using MMTs
may endanger the very fabric of who we are—our personal identity. This threat has
been mainly considered in relation to two interrelated concerns: truthfulness and
narrative self‐constitution. In this article, we propose that although this perspective
brings up important matters concerning the potential aftermaths of MMT utilization,
it fails to tell the whole story. We suggest that capturing more tangible potential
consequences of MMT use, namely, its psychological ramifications is crucial both in
ethical considerations and in making decisions regarding the permissibility of such
interventions. To this end, we first examine what current MMTs are capable of and
what are the prospects of emerging MMTs. Subsequently, we outline the relation-
ship between memory and personal identity; specifically, we indicate that concepts
of self‐defining memories and narrative identity are crucial to considering how
MMTs may influence one's psychological functioning. On this basis, we analyze
potential consequences of narrative disruption that may be the result of the use of
MMTs; more precisely, we consider its potential effects on mental health, well‐
being, and personal agency, and outline the ethical dilemmas that decision‐makers
face in this context. We conclude by considering the broader cultural context that
may have influence on policymaking regarding permissibility of memory modification
interventions.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Memory modification technologies (MMTs)—interventions within the
memory affecting its functions and contents in specific ways1—raise
great hopes but also great fears. Ethicists have expressed concerns that
developing and using MMTs may endanger the very fabric of who we
are—our personal identity. This threat has been framed and considered
in bio‐ and neuroethical literature in relation to two interrelated con-
cerns: truthfulness2 and narrative identity self‐constitution.3
As Liao and Sandberg4 claim
memories enable us to form a certain narrative iden-
tity, which is crucial to our having a sense of what we
believe to be true about ourselves. From our past
experiences and our memory of them, we may believe
that we are brave or cowardly; altruistic or selfish;
generous or stingy; and we may identify ourselves
with certain ideologies: liberal or conservative; egali-
tarian or elitist; feminist or male‐chauvinist, and so on.
If we modify our memories in a certain way, this may
change what we believe to be true about ourselves.
Some argue that this, in turn, may have radical consequences: “to
deprive oneself of one's memory—in its truthfulness also of feeling—
is to deprive oneself of one's own life and identity.”5 This intuition is
also apparent in an influential conception of narrative identity—
Schechtman's narrative self‐constitution view.6 According to
Schechtman's theory, having true memories must be of crucial im-
portance, since identity self‐constitution requires that a person ar-
ticulate the true story about herself. Thus, since memories constitute
building blocks of our stories, their modification could make our
narrative identities false, and consequently make us who we are not.
This perspective brings up important matters concerning the
potential aftermath of MMTs. On the other hand, it fails to tell the
whole story since its primary aim is to explain the metaphysical issue
of identity self‐constitution. However important, this framework is
too narrow as this is not the only potential ramification of memory‐
modifying interventions that bio‐ and neuroethicists should capture.
We should also understand what are more tangible potential con-
sequences of MMT use, namely, its psychological ramifications as
these are crucial both in ethical considerations and in policymaking
regarding the permissibility of such interventions. Before considering
these issues, it is necessary to review what current MMTs are ac-
tually capable of and what are the prospects of the emerging ones.
2 | MEMORY‐MODIFYING CAPABILITIES
OF CURRENT MMTS
MMTs can modify memories through interference with the pro-
cess either of consolidation, or of reconsolidation.7 Using MMTs
to interfere with the process of consolidation means to block or
alter the initial memory formation; interfering with the process of
reconsolidation, on the other hand, means to intervene during a
window of vulnerability in such a way that the re‐storage of the
memory is blocked or altered.8 Taking into account that it is rarely
possible to administer MMTs in the aftermath of trauma, the
discovery that previously consolidated (old) memories can be
disrupted during a window of vulnerability occurring after their
reactivation holds promise of memory‐modifying interventions
that may be implemented months or even years after experien-
cing a traumatizing event. This approach—reconsolidation‐based
treatment—surpasses consolidation‐based interventions in sev-
eral meaningful ways, mitigating the set of clinical and ethical
concerns previously expressed towards MMTs.9
Although it has been known for many years that reconsolidation
blockade with protein synthesis inhibitors disrupts hippocampal‐
mediated memories—there have been means to erase even well‐
consolidated memories—these agents cannot be used in humans
because they are highly toxic.10 For this reason, researchers have
studied other memory‐modifying drugs. Reconsolidation‐based ad-
ministration in humans of one of the most auspicious of them, pro-
pranolol, has been intensely investigated in recent years.11
The first line of research on reconsolidation propranolol‐based
interventions in humans studied a clinical population of individuals
1Liao, S. M., & Sandberg, A. (2008). The normativity of memory modification. Neuroethics,
1(2), 85–99. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-008-9009-5
2Lavazza, A. (2016). What we may forget when discussing human memory manipulation.
AJOB Neuroscience, 7(4), 249–251. https://doi.org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1251988; Liao
& Sandberg, op. cit. note 1; Liao, S. M., & Wasserman, D. T. (2007). Neuroethical concerns
about moderating traumatic memories. The American Journal of Bioethics, 7(9), 38–40.
https://doi.org/10.1080/15265160701518623
3This has been also sometimes framed as a question about the person's authenticity.
Zawadzki, P., & Adamczyk, A. K. (2021). Personality and authenticity in light of the memory‐
modifying potential of optogenetics. AJOB Neuroscience, 12(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.
1080/21507740.2020.1866097; Lavazza, A. (2019). Moral Bioenhancement through
memory‐editing: A risk for identity and authenticity? Topoi, 38(1), 15–27. https://doi.org/10.
1007/s11245-017-9465-9; Lavazza, A. (2018). Memory‐modulation: Self‐improvement or
self‐depletion? Frontiers in Psychology, 9, 469. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00469;
Gligorov, N. (2016). Neuroethics and the scientific revision of common sense. Springer, pp.
84–92; Hui, K., & Fisher, C. E. (2015). The ethics of molecular memory modification. Journal
of Medical Ethics, 41(7), 515–520. https://doi.org/10.1136/medethics-2013-101891; Erler,
A. (2011). Does memory modification threaten our authenticity? Neuroethics, 4(3), 235–249.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-010-9090-4
4Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
5Kass, L. (2003). Beyond therapy: Biotechnology and the pursuit of human improvement. Pre-
sident's Council on Bioethics, Washington, DC. https://www.Bioethics.Gov.
6Schechtman, M. (2014). Staying alive: Personal identity, practical concerns, and the unity of a
life. Oxford University Press.
7Phelps, E. A., & Hofmann, S. G. (2019). Memory editing from science fiction to clinical
practice. Nature, 572(7767), 43–50. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1433-7
8Schiller, D., & Phelps, E. A. (2011). Does reconsolidation occur in humans? Frontiers in
Behavioral Neuroscience, 5, 24. https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2011.00024
9Elsey, J., & Kindt, M. (2016). Manipulating human memory through reconsolidation: Ethical
implications of a new therapeutic approach. AJOB Neuroscience, 7(4), 225–236. https://doi.
org/10.1080/21507740.2016.1218377
10Phelps & Hofmann, op. cit. note 7.
11Propranolol is not the only non‐toxic agent that has been studied. For instance, gluco-
corticoids were effective in reducing the expression of the fear memory by means of aug-
menting consolidation of the inhibitory memory, which suppresses the expression of the
fear. However, this effect was temporary. Moreover, glucocorticoids impair retrieval of
emotional memories (Elsey & Kindt, op. cit. note 9). For these reasons, we focus on pro-
pranolol as this appears the most clinically promising memory‐modifying drug.
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with post‐traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—a mental disorder that
may develop after experiencing trauma and for which the sympto-
matology may include intrusion symptoms (flashbacks, nightmares,
physiological responses, uncontrollable thoughts or feelings related
to a traumatic event), avoidance symptoms (avoidance of places,
events, thoughts, or feelings reminding of trauma), cognition and
mood symptoms, and arousal and reactivity symptoms.12 The results
of these studies strongly suggest that propranolol might be effective
in altering the reconsolidation13 of a reactivated trauma memory in a
therapeutically relevant manner. Propranolol was shown to reduce
autonomic nervous system arousal (recorded using measures such as
heart rate and skin conductance response [SCR] and electromyogram
[EMG] of the facial frowning muscle) to traumatic memory below the
normative PTSD cut‐offs as well as some PTSD symptomatology.14
Another research group repeatedly demonstrated that propra-
nolol administration in healthy populations efficiently reduces the
conditioned fear response (measured by EMG as a startle potentia-
tion) and prevents the return of the fear.15 However, in contrast to
the studies of Brunet and colleagues, propranolol was ineffective in
this research in reducing SCR. It is hypothesized that these results
may reflect the possibility that startle potentiation is indicative of less
conscious emotional expression that is relatively insensitive to in-
structions. SCR, in contrast, may depend on conscious associative
learning. Thus, startle potentiation is thought to be an indicator of the
conditioned fear, whereas SCR may be related to the declarative
memory for the fear association.16 In more general terms, this may
indicate that propranolol alters emotional expression of the memory,
but not its content. Last but not least, this research group has also
shown that promising clinical applications of reconsolidation‐based
propranolol administration are not restricted to PTSD. They de-
monstrated that it is possible to effectively diminish fear response to
older and stronger memories that constitute specific phobias such as
fear of spiders,17 snakes, and heights.18 To conclude, propranolol is
able to alter emotional components (or, at least, emotional expres-
sions) of excessively emotional (traumatic, fear, or phobic) memories.
Initial results suggest that a similar effect is also achievable via a non‐
invasive technique of state‐dependent repetitive transcranial mag-
netic stimulation over prefrontal cortex (PFC–rTMS).19
A novel MMT, optogenetics, shows an even wider range of
memory modifications. To date optogenetics has been used to: ac-
tivate and deactivate acquired an in vivo fearful memory,20 modify
factual details or change the valence of memory (implant “false
memory”),21 and to recover a “forgotten” infant memory primarily in
rodents, but also in non‐human primates.22 In animal studies, the
modification of a given memory is inferred from the modification of
behavior typically evoked by such memories (e.g., stress response
evoked in a context in which an animal repeatedly received mild
electric shocks). Thus, most of the aforementioned studies utilized a
well‐established fear conditioning paradigm to create a fearful
memory in a studied animal whose neural underpinning could then be
traced and subjected to optogenetic manipulations (for recent re-
views of how this has been done see23). A similar fear conditioning
procedure is systematically used to study the impact of memory‐
modifying techniques (such as pharmacological agents) in humans.24
Current optogenetic systems involve genetic modification of
neurons through the insertion of opsin genes via viral infection and
implantation of optical fibers with concomitant lesion of neural
structures. Inserted opsins are then utilized as mediators to regulate
the flow of electrically charged ions across membranes in response to
light pulses. Since they are placed in specific cell types and neuronal
12Bisson, J. I., Cosgrove, S., Lewis, C., & Roberts, N. P. (2015). Post‐traumatic stress disorder.
The BMJ, 351, h6161. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.h6161
13Although there is a discussion as to whether the findings of this research group can be
attributed to interference with the reconsolidation or alteration of the memory retrieval
(Elsey & Kindt, op. cit. note 9).
14Brunet, A., Saumier, D., Liu, A., Streiner, D. L., Tremblay, J., & Pitman, R. K. (2018). Re-
duction of PTSD symptoms with pre‐reactivation propranolol therapy: A randomized con-
trolled trial. American Journal of Psychiatry, 175(5), 427–433. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.
ajp.2017.17050481; Poundja, J., Sanche, S., Tremblay, J., & Brunet, A. (2012). Trauma re-
activation under the influence of propranolol: An examination of clinical predictors. European
Journal of Psychotraumatology, 3, 22893836. https://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v3i0.15470;
Brunet, A., Poundja, J., Tremblay, J., Bui, E., Thomas, E., Orr, S. P., Azzoug, A., Birmes, P., &
Pitman, R. K. (2011). Trauma reactivation under the influence of propranolol decreases
posttraumatic stress symptoms and disorder: 3 open‐label trials. Journal of Clinical Psycho-
pharmacology, 31(4), 547–550. https://doi.org/10.1097/JCP.0b013e318222f360; Brunet,
A., Orr, S. P., Tremblay, J., Robertson, K., Nader, K., & Pitman, R. K. (2008). Effect of post‐
retrieval propranolol on psychophysiologic responding during subsequent script‐driven
traumatic imagery in post‐traumatic stress disorder. Journal of Psychiatric Research, 42(6),
503–506. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2007.05.006
15Soeter, M., & Kindt, M. (2015). An abrupt transformation of phobic behavior after a post‐
retrieval amnesic agent. Biological Psychiatry, 78(12), 880–886. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
biopsych.2015.04.006; Soeter, M., & Kindt, M. (2012). Stimulation of the noradrenergic
system during memory formation impairs extinction learning but not the disruption of re-
consolidation. Neuropsychopharmacology: Official Publication of the American College of
Neuropsychopharmacology, 37(5), 1204–1215. https://doi.org/10.1038/npp.2011.307; So-
eter, M., & Kindt, M. (2011). Disrupting reconsolidation: Pharmacological and behavioral
manipulations. Learning & Memory, 18(6), 357–366. https://doi.org/10.1101/lm.2148511;
Soeter, M., & Kindt, M. (2010). Dissociating response systems: Erasing fear from memory.
Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 94(1), 30–41. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlm.2010.03.
004; Kindt, M., Soeter, M., & Vervliet, B. (2009). Beyond extinction: Erasing human fear
responses and preventing the return of fear. Nature Neuroscience, 12(3), 256–258. https://
doi.org/10.1038/nn.2271
16Elsey & Kindt, op. cit. note 9; Soeter & Kindt (2010), op. cit. note 15.
17Soeter & Kindt (2015), op. cit. note 15.
18Elsey, J., & Kindt, M. (2017). Breaking boundaries: Optimizing reconsolidation‐based in-
terventions for strong and old memories. Learning & Memory, 24(9), 472–479. https://doi.
org/10.1101/lm.044156.116
19Borgomaneri, S., Battaglia, S., Garofalo, S., Tortora, F., Avenanti, A., & di Pellegrino, G.
(2020). State‐dependent TMS over prefrontal cortex disrupts fear‐memory reconsolidation
and prevents the return of fear. Current Biology, 30(18), 3672–3679.e4. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.cub.2020.06.091
20The researchers were able to achieve this by using the long‐term depression (LTD) pro-
tocol. It is believed that LTD weakens synaptic efficacy and decreases spine density
(Josselyn, S. A., & Tonegawa, S. (2020). Memory engrams: Recalling the past and imagining
the future. Science, 367(6473), eaaw4325. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaw4325).
Moreover, by utilizing a long‐term potentiation (LTP) protocol they succeeded in retrieving
the previously deactivated memory (Nabavi, S., Fox, R., Proulx, C. D., Lin, J. Y., Tsien, R. Y., &
Malinow, R. (2014). Engineering a memory with LTD and LTP. Nature, 511(7509), 348–352.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13294).
21Ryan, T. J., Roy, D. S., Pignatelli, M., Arons, A., & Tonegawa, S. (2015). Engram cells retain
memory under retrograde amnesia. Science, 348(6238), 1007–1013. https://doi.org/10.
1126/science.aaa5542; Ramirez, S., Liu, X., Lin, P.‐A., Suh, J., Pignatelli, M., Redondo, R. L.,
Ryan, T. J., & Tonegawa, S. (2013). Creating a false memory in the hippocampus. Science,
341(6144), 387–391. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1239073
22El‐Shamayleh, Y., & Horwitz, G. D. (2019). Primate optogenetics: Progress and prognosis.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 116(52), 26195–26203. https://doi.org/10.
1073/pnas.1902284116
23Adamczyk, A. K., & Zawadzki, P. (2020). The memory‐modifying potential of optogenetics
and the need for neuroethics. NanoEthics, 14, 207–225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-
020-00377-1; Josselyn & Tonegawa, op. cit. note 20.
24Elsey & Kindt, op. cit. note 9.
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pathways, their expression enables optogenetics to activate or re-
versibly silence (inhibit) specific neural circuits. Because of the ther-
apeutic potential of optogenetics (which is not restricted to memory
modifications), there is an intensive effort to design optogenetic
systems that are sufficiently safe and non‐invasive to be used in
humans. The progress of this research is rapid.25 Thus, although
optogenetics' transformation from an investigatory tool utilized in
animal models into therapeutic MMT in humans will take at least a
dozen years,26 it is important to start considering whether there may
be inherently undesirable neuroethical consequences of optoge-
netics, among other memory‐modifying technologies.
3 | PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF
NARRATIVE IDENTITY DISRUPTION
VIA MMTS
Singer et al.'s27 discussion of narrative identity is useful to consider
how memory modifications may influence a person's psychology.
Singer et al.28 argue that self‐defining memories—autobiographical
memories constitutive of the most important and recursive themes in a
person's life—and narrative scripts—a person's rules for predicting, in-
terpreting, and responding to a set of scenes (i.e., events, memories)—
serve as the ingredients for the overall life story of a person. These
components, in turn, make up the narrative identity of a given
individual. To further elucidate their model, they propose to
think of the pool of self‐defining memories and scripts
as possessing a synchronic existence within narrative
identity; they accumulate associations and connec-
tions, while remaining relatively static in the person-
ality. One can think of the life story as diachronic—it
moves forward in time and continually amends itself in
light of new experiences.
One of the most general questions from a neuroethical per-
spective that may arise in this context is: why should we consider a
narrative valuable, or fear its possible disruptions by memory mod-
ifications? As we noted in the Introduction, influential accounts have
argued that a narrative is a constitutive condition of the self. In the
next subsections, we provide different answers to this question by
analyzing more tangible consequences of the narrative disruption
that may be the result of MMT use.
3.1 | Transformational power of self‐defining
memories and their contribution to personal growth
and happiness
In recent years, psychologists have explored the relationship be-
tween narrative identity and adaptation. Investigations in this area
show that individuals who find redemptive meanings in suffering and
reversals and who construct narratives emphasizing personal agency
and self‐exploration usually enjoy better mental health and overall
well‐being.29 Many instances of redemption sequences are present in
the life stories of middle‐aged adults who score high on self‐reported
measures of generativity (indicator of a strong commitment to im-
proving society and promoting the well‐being of future genera-
tions).30 In redemption sequences, demonstrably “bad” or emotionally
negative events lead to demonstrably “good” or emotionally positive
outcomes. The initial negative state is thus “redeemed” by the greater
good perceived by the self as its ultimate result. Redemption in-
dicates the transition in a life narrative from an emotionally negative
event to a positive outcome or positive attribution in relation to the
self. The adaptative function of conceptualizing lives as stories of
redemption may be reliant on sustaining the hope or confidence
needed in trials and tribulations while reinforcing longer‐term
commitments.31
Therefore, if an individual were to decide to remove (with the use
of optogenetics) or to change or dampen the emotional component
(with the use of optogenetics, propranolol, or PFC–rTMS) of negative
memories, she might deprive herself of the opportunity to experience
a redemption sequence. Thus, such interventions might deprive an
25Rich, M., Zhang, E., Dickey, A., Jones, H., Cannon, K., Bandera, Y., Foulger, S., Lubin, F., &
Bolding, M. (2020). A noninvasive approach to optogenetics using focused ultrasound blood
brain barrier disruption for the delivery of radioluminescent particles. BioRxiv. https://doi.
org/10.1101/2020.08.20.248302; Bedbrook, C. N., Yang, K. K., Robinson, J. E., Mackey, E.
D., Gradinaru, V., & Arnold, F. H. (2019). Machine learning‐guided channel rhodopsin en-
gineering enables minimally invasive optogenetics. Nature Methods, 16(11), 1176–1184.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41592-019-0583-8
26As several technological breakthroughs must be achieved before optogenetics could be
systematically used in human brains; Shen, Y., Campbell, R. E., Côté, D. C., & Paquet, M.‐E.
(2020). Challenges for therapeutic applications of opsin‐based optogenetic tools in humans.
Frontiers in Neural Circuits, 14, 41. https://doi.org/10.3389/fncir.2020.00041). However, it is
worth noting that clinical trials using optogenetics have already begun for advanced retinitis
pigmentosa, so there is already a precedent in therapeutic utilization of this technology in
humans; Montazeri, L., El Zarif, N., Trenholm, S., & Sawan, M. (2019). Optogenetic stimu-
lation for restoring vision to patients suffering from retinal degenerative diseases: Current
strategies and future directions. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Circuits and Systems, 13(6),
1792–1807. https://doi.org/10.1109/TBCAS.2019.2951298. Sahel, J. A., Boulanger‐
Scemama, E., Pagot, C., Arleo, A., Galluppi, F., Martel, J. N., Esposti, S. D., Delaux, A., de Saint
Aubert, J. B., de Montleau, C., Gutman, E., Audo, T., Duebel, J., Picaud, S., Dalkara, D., Blouin,
L., Taiel, M., & Roska, B. (2021). Partial recovery of visual function in a blind patient after
optogenetic therapy. Nature Medicine, 27, 1223–1229. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41591-
021-01351-4
27Singer, J. A., Blagov, P., Berry, M., & Oost, K. M. (2013). Self‐defining memories, scripts,
and the life story: Narrative identity in personality and psychotherapy: Healthy narrative
identity. Journal of Personality, 81(6), 569–582. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12005
28Ibid.
29McAdams, D. P. (2011). Narrative identity. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles
(Eds.), Handbook of identity theory and research (pp. 99–115). Springer. https://doi.org/10.
1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_5
30Lilgendahl, J. P., & McAdams, D. P. (2011). Constructing stories of self‐growth: How
individual differences in patterns of autobiographical reasoning relate to well‐being in
midlife. Journal of Personality, 79(2), 391–428. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.
00688.x; McAdams, D. P., Reynolds, J., Lewis, M., Patten, A. H., & Bowman, P. J. (2001).
When bad things turn good and good things turn bad: Sequences of redemption and con-
tamination in life narrative and then‐relation to psychosocial adaptation in midlife adults and
in students. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(4), 474–485. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0146167201274008
31McAdams, D. P., & McLean, K. C. (2013). Narrative identity. Current Directions in Psycho-
logical Science, 22(3), 233–238. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413475622; Walker, L. J.,
& Frimer, J. A. (2007). Moral personality of brave and caring exemplars. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 93(5), 845–860. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.845
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individual of the potential for finding meaning in suffering and pre-
vent her from reshaping emotionally negative events into positive
outcomes such as self‐transformation, or involvement in prosocial
goals, for example, helping others. Therefore, the concept of re-
demption sequences suggests that to make someone's life more
fulfilling, it may not be sufficient merely to influence memory through
MMT. It may be that we often need to come to terms with more
difficult times in our lives to transform ourselves—an idea consistent
with a long humanistic tradition emphasizing the character‐shaping
role of hardships.
The redemption sequence points to the broader adaptational
problem of how humans make sense of suffering in their lives in
narrative terms. Research on narrative identity suggests that adults
who emerge stronger or enhanced due to negative life experiences
tend to engage in a two‐step process: the first associated with per-
sonal growth, the second with happiness.32 In the first step, the
negative event is re‐experienced and reconsidered. The individual
explores questions concerning how the event came about, what it
might have led to, and what role it might play in her autobiographical
story. In the second step, the individual articulates and commits
herself to a positive resolution of the experience.
Thus, a person that undergoes erasure or change of the valence
of the negative (or even traumatic) memory might miss an opportu-
nity to undertake self‐exploratory measures concerning her experi-
ences. She may, therefore, be unable to take advantage of bad
experiences by learning a life lesson and gaining valuable insight into
a deeper layer of herself. In more naturalistic terms, the individual
may miss the opportunity to strengthen her “psychological immune
system,”33 and thus, deprive herself of the positive effects of over-
coming negative experiences, as many studies demonstrate that po-
sitive resolution of negative events is associated with higher levels of
happiness and well‐being.34
Traumatic experiences often constitute self‐defining mem-
ories.35 Self‐defining memories are postulated to be “affectively
charged reconstructions of past events that have the power to shake
our rational understanding of past experiences, [and] bias our on-
going processing of information.”36 Thus, erasure or “pacification” of
self‐defining memories may infringe these powerful lenses, a person's
interpretations, and with them her experiences, interactions, values,
and reactions could become altered. This may endanger a person's
authenticity—the very sense of being oneself (for works devoted
exclusively to this issue see37).
Modifications of self‐defining memories may also lead to en-
croaching a person's narrative scripts. In psychotherapy, overcoming
adverse narrative scripts can have positive effects for an individual—it
can allow him to introduce “new behavior and lead to different
endings to situations that would otherwise have repeated his familiar
pattern of disappointment and humiliation.”38 Modifying narrative
scripts by altering memories that constitute them with the use of
MMTs, may, however, undermine efforts of the individual's work on
self‐reflective overcoming of a negative experience and not let new
behavioral scripts develop during this process.
Assume that a person gives unconditional support and trust to his
husband, and, as a result, he experienced exploitation and betrayal.
A painful memory that is a result of this betrayal may serve as a lever
to overcome narrative scripts of this “unconditionality.” More specifi-
cally, one may decide to stay with one's partner, but only on the
condition that he will never cheat on him again, and if he decides to
break that condition, their relationship shall come to an end. So, if he
was to erase the memory of his partner's past betrayal, he risks re-
peating the same pattern of behavior as he does not learn from the
experience, thereby precluding change of his behavioral scripts—
“those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”
On the other hand, Liao and Sandberg39 argue that even if we
remove a declarative memory of an event, the procedural memory
will still remain. That procedural memory could be sufficient to pro-
tect a person from committing the same mistake again, as one would
follow the “intuition,” “hunch,” or “somatic marker” in the neu-
roscientific nomenclature40 that develops in addition to factual
memory of an event. Returning to our example, imagine that a be-
trayed husband forgives his partner on the condition that he will
never betray him again, but this time he also decides to remove a
declarative memory of the whole affair to “clean the slate.” Applying
the logic of Liao and Sandberg,41 were the unfaithful partner to cheat
on him in the future, procedural memory (“hunch” or “gut feeling”)
would protect the betrayed husband from repeating the same mis-
take of trusting and forgiving. So, in the case of subsequent betrayal
(s), the exploited partner would decide not to remove his memory,
but instead leave his unfaithful husband.
However, it might be questionable if one would choose to follow
his hunches and gut feelings in making such an important decision as
leaving one's partner, as one could be committed to being a rational
person who does not base his decisions on gut feelings or “sixth
32McAdams &McLean, op. cit. note 31; King, L. A., & Hicks, J. A. (2007). Whatever happened
to ‘What might have been’? Regrets, happiness, and maturity. American Psychologist, 62(7),
625–636. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.7.625; McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L.
(2006). A new Big Five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality.
American Psychologist, 61(3), 204–217. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.3.204
33Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2008). Explaining away: A model of affective adaptation.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(5), 370–386. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.
2008.00085.x
34Tavernier, R., & Willoughby, T. (2012). Adolescent turning points: The association between
meaning‐making and psychological well‐being. Developmental Psychology, 48(4), 1058–1068.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026326; Lilgendahl & McAdams, op. cit. note 30; McAdams, op.
cit. note 29; King & Hicks, op. cit. note 32.
35McAdams, D. P., & Jones, B. K. (2017). Making meaning in the wake of trauma. In E. M.
Altmaier (Ed.), Reconstructing meaning after trauma (pp. 3–16). Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.
1016/B978-0-12-803015-8.00001-2
36Singer, J. A., & Blagov, P. (2004). The integrative function of narrative processing: Auto-
biographical memory, self‐defining memories, and the life story of identity. In D. R. Beike, J.
M. Lampinen, & D. A. Behrend (Eds.), The self and memory (pp. 117–138). Psychology Press.
37Zawadzki & Adamczyk, op. cit. note 3; Lavazza (2019), op. cit. note 3; Erler, op. cit. note 3.
38Singer, J. A., & Bonalume, L. (2010). Autobiographical memory narratives in psychotherapy:
A coding system applied to the case of Cynthia. Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy, 6(3),
134–188.
39Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
40Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' error: Emotion, rationality and the human brain. Put-
nam, p. 352.
41Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
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senses.” Moreover, it seems plausible that lacking the knowledge of
one's partners history of betrayals, one could easily misattribute his
“hunch” feelings and interpret them as signs of deep suffering that
have resulted from a current betrayal, rather than an indication that
he has been deceived for the second time.42 Finally, when trying to
find an explanation for the partner's ambiguous behavior (for in-
stance, his late arrival), one might undermine potential “hunch”
feelings as irrational and paranoid, and thus be motivated to suppress
them. Consequently, when faced with the second betrayal, the be-
trayed husband might either decide to (again) come to an agreement,
forgive his partner and decide to (again) remove his memory of this
unfortunate incident, or to completely ignore all the “warning signs”
that could be an indication of infidelity.
Let us now consider an alternative scenario of removing only the
emotional component of the betrayed husband's memory, as were he to
decide to give another chance to this relationship, he might be interested
in relieving himself of the emotional burden associated with his partner's
betrayal, rather than removing the declarative memory of that event.
In this scenario, we argue, breaking the spell of dysfunctional behavioral
scripts of a betrayed husband is also unlikely. Cognitive (neuro)science
undermines a long‐held view of people as predominantly rational agents
and tends to emphasize the role of emotions in both learning and decision
making.43 In theory, learning from experience could be based solely on
the factual content of bad memories, but in practice, negative affective
content seems indispensable to prevent following the same dysfunctional
pattern of behavior. Returning to our example: knowledge that a husband
committed infidelity may not be sufficient to leave him, as a strong
emotional reaction—a deep pain—is required for a person to make such a
difficult and important life‐changing decision.
To conclude, when emotions are divorced from knowledge (as could
be the case when one would remove declarative content of memory),
they appear to be degraded in intensity to mild, free‐floating “hunches” or
“gut feelings” that can be easily misinterpreted, misattributed, or under-
mined as being unsupported by relevant “evidence.” So, although hunch
feelings might be enough to push one in the right direction when it comes
to decisions that are, to a large extent, reached automatically (such as
whether to put the pedal to the metal or to drive responsibly44), it may be
that strong, fully‐fledged emotions (that have an unambiguous and easily
identifiable source) are needed to reach important, life‐changing deci-
sions. On the other hand, when knowledge is divorced from emotions (as
could be the case when one would remove an affective component of
memory), it may also lack the motivational power to influence one's de-
cisions, as people appear to depend heavily on their built‐in emotional
compasses in addition to or independently from the possessed knowl-
edge.45 Finally, it appears that both ingredients are necessary to bring a
substantial change into one's life narrative as revealed by the transfor-
mational power of highly emotional experiences.46 Therefore, the pro-
spect of erasure of only the declarative or only the emotional component
of a memory does not seem to prevent a person from repeating the same
mistakes again and may actually be an obstacle for the development of
new, healthy behavioral scripts to deal with adverse situations in
one's life.
In summary, although blunting the emotional impact of one's
memories or erasing them altogether might seem a tempting way to
relieve current suffering, it seems to bring only a short‐term resolu-
tion, ultimately blocking the opportunities for personal growth and
leading to greater long‐term unhappiness as one fails to introduce
necessary changes to one's life and instead preserves the status quo.
It is important to note that failing to adjust one's behavior to new
circumstances often not only exacerbates the existing problems, but
also might lead to new ones, creating a negative feedback loop.47 For
instance, in the case of the betrayed husband, his forgiving attitude
and unconditional love after repeated removal of his memories could
lead to disregard and more frequent and blatant betrayals by his
partner, who could eventually decide to dump such a naïve person,
for whom he has lost all respect—a prospect that would arguably
bring more pain than initiating the end of the relationship on one's
own. Conceivably, this could also affect relations with his friends and
family, who could, for instance, start avoiding him, also losing respect
for someone seemingly so desperate to stay in such a dysfunctional
relationship, or, simply not knowing how to behave in these unusual
circumstances (e.g., whether to break the news to him or remain
silent and watch how he is being taken advantage of by his partner).
It seems that, in cases of modification involving the erasure or de-
activation of the valence of adverse memories, we are dealing with a
difficult calculation between the pros and cons of overcoming painful
memories on one's own (or with the help of a psychotherapist) versus
deleting or modifying the source of suffering, that is, memory. On
one hand, it seems obvious that clinicians should respect a patient's
autonomy and allow one to make an independent decision regarding
modification versus an attempt to overcome a given memory on her
own. On the other hand, patients may too often opt for memory
modification on the basis of their current mental suffering. It is a well‐
established psychological truism that most people tend to put the
interests of the current self before those of the future self. Fur-
thermore, this preference seems all the more likely in the context of
memory modifications given that research shows that establishing
the meaning of personal narratives is hard work and may prove
emotionally costly.48
Therefore, the difficult question arises as to whether clinicians
should take a paternalistic approach in situations of this kind. The
42Remember in this context appraisal theories of emotion and the classic “bridge” experi-
ment on misattribution of arousal (Schachter, S., & Singer, J. (1962). Cognitive, social, and
physiological determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69(5), 379–399. https://
doi.org/10.1037/h0046234; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misattribution_of_arousal).
43Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus & Giroux; Ariely, D. (2008).
Predictably irrational: The hidden forces that shape our decisions. HarperCollins Publishers.
44An example of Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
45Damasio, op. cit. note 40.
46McAdams & Jones, op. cit. note 35; Wilson, J. P. (2007). The posttraumatic self: Restoring
meaning and wholeness to personality. Routledge.
47Many thanks to Andrea Lavazza, whose insights helped us to develop this argument.
48McAdams, op. cit. note 29.
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answer is all the more difficult because no one can know a priori
whether a given memory is pathological, or whether a person can
cope with it by incorporating it into the adaptive narrative, thus en-
riching herself in the long term. It appears that the issue of what is
adaptive for a given person as opposed to what is purely harmful
depends on the individual characteristics of a person. Therefore, the
potential for a strict demarcation between adaptive and pathological
memories that can be applied to the entire clinical population appears
extremely difficult, if not illusory. Thus, it seems that the decision of
whether to intervene should be individualized/adjusted to a parti-
cular case. More specifically, what should, at the very least, be taken
into account are one's system of values, life goals, and long‐term
aspirations whose achievement might have been hindered or un-
dermined by a traumatic (memory of an) event (the issues on which
we elaborate more in the next subsection). This is because—as we
mentioned earlier—traumatic events have a very strong transforma-
tional power and they often become self‐defining memories. In a
broader perspective, such decisions would probably also reflect, to
some extent, the values that would dominate in society, when MMTs
become a more widespread form of intervention. For instance, in the
above discussion, the relevant values to be discussed are along the
line of autonomy (motivated by the care about the freedom of choice
of the person's current self)/paternalism (motivated by the care about
the person's future self). We return to this topic and discuss it from a
broader perspective in the Conclusions.
3.2 | Personal agency, mental health, and well‐
being
Altering personal agency is another crucial issue in the context of
potential narrative disruption that may be the effect of modifying
painful memories. Removal or emotional modification of difficult
memories may result in diminishing a patient's sense of agency, that
is, her feelings and beliefs about her ability to control herself, the
world, and others, and to make her own decisions. We propose to
distinguish between the normatively and psychotherapeutically re-
levant components of this concern.
The former refers to the idea that an individual should respect
herself as an agent.49 Agency can be either viewed as an autotelic
value or explicated in more naturalistic and functional terms. In the
former perspective, it is important to believe that we are creatures
with free will and the ability to determine our own destiny. Thus, it
can be argued that by removing a memory or deactivating its nega-
tive emotional component by means of MMTs, the individual misses
an opportunity to think through the experience in question and to
ultimately overcome it on her own terms. Thus, she gives up self‐
determined agency for the sake of more hedonistic values such as
“peace of mind.” On the other hand, functionalists may refer to
the adaptive dimension of agency. In simplified terms, a more
naturalistically inclined ethicist may argue that every time one takes
an action one learns something new; when one fights hardships (in-
stead of giving up), one's fitness increases over the long term. Thus,
agency is valuable from the adaptive perspective.
The psychotherapeutic aspect of the issue of personal agency in
the context of memory modifications refers to the relationship be-
tween the process of incorporating memories with negative emo-
tional valence into the autobiographical story and mental health.
In Adler's50 studies of psychotherapy treatment, enhancement in
patients' perception of their own personal agency preceded and
predicted alleviation of symptoms and improvement in mental health.
As patients constructed stories that increasingly emphasized their
ability to control their surroundings and make their own choices, they
showed corresponding reductions in symptoms and improvements in
mental health. Therefore, the opportunity to think through the
memory of an unpleasant event appears important not only because
it incorporates respect for oneself as an agent, but also because, if
executed successfully (i.e., if incorporated into the adaptive narrative
story emphasizing one's agency in overcoming hardships), it may
improve the patient's mental health.
On the other hand, it appears that the only possible solution to
overcoming a traumatic memory is meaning‐making, which materi-
alizes in committing oneself to turn a negative experience into
something positive, for example, by helping other victims of similar
trauma/abuse or raising society's awareness of a problem one might
have experienced themselves (consider the #MeToo movement or
Sharon Tate's mother's efforts). Consequently, engaging in the pro-
cess of overcoming the trauma on one's own (i.e., without the use of
MMT) may paradoxically narrow down one's options, enforcing the
re‐evaluation of one's goals in life, and ultimately diminish one's
agency. Moreover, some experiences may be so painful that an in-
dividual could be left incapable of not only constructing a satisfying
narrative, but even leading a functional life due to the adverse
memory. Some claim that recurring traumatic memories resulting in
the development of PTSD constitute a paradigmatic example of hi-
jacking of narrative identity.51 In such cases, personal agency and
autonomy may be augmented by MMTs by offering a “fresh start.”
This argument applies primarily to clinical cases. However, let us
consider two cases in which the use of MMTs could also be justified
by non‐clinical objectives—the first deals with not wanting to give up
one's previous life and the second one with not being able to em-
brace one's new life.
Consider a person, Nietzscheana, who does not want to pursue
prosocial goals, such as helping others, and might instead want to
pursue more egoistic goals, such as wealth, fame, and power. Imagine
that Nietzscheana experiences some traumatic event. In such a
49Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
50Adler, J. M. (2012). Living into the story: Agency and coherence in a longitudinal study of
narrative identity development and mental health over the course of psychotherapy. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(2), 367–389. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025289
51McAdams, D. P. (2019). Psychopathology and the self: Human actors, agents, and authors.
Journal of Personality, 88(1), 146–155. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12496; Hobfoll, S. E.,
Gaffey, A. E., & Wagner, L. M. (2020). PTSD and the influence of context: The self as a social
mirror. Journal of Personality, 88(1), 76–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12439
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scenario, to successfully deal with her traumatic (or very negative, yet
not clinically relevant) experience, she would be left with no choice
but to create an effective redemption story, which would enforce the
incorporation of her trauma into her narrative self. However, in the
case of Nietzscheana, it is very likely that this would necessitate a
change in her previous life goals, system of values, and aspirations.
Eventually, Nietzscheana would end up with fewer potential life
stories that she could create than before her trauma. Although one
could argue that it would actually be a “good” change—a kind of moral
development that should be encouraged as it would likely have po-
sitive consequences for society—from the perspective of Nietz-
scheana, it could be best to remove a traumatic memory to get her
“back on track” to achieve goals she was striving for before her
traumatic experience.
The above considerations illustrate a case when one might not
want to give up one's previous life (goals) after an unexpected and
potentially life‐changing event, and may object to the idea of trans-
forming oneself to successfully cope with a trauma. However, there
may also be cases when one has successfully dealt with a trauma in
terms of (not developing) clinical symptoms, but nonetheless, past
memories are hindering full embracement of one's self‐determined
life‐path.
Remember in this context the case of J. D. Vance, the protagonist
of Hillbilly elegy (2020). It might be true that had he not been exposed
to negative experiences during his childhood, he would not have had
such strong motivation to become a top Ivy League student. Imagine,
however, that at some point in his life, when J. D. is a prosperous
adult, he finds himself haunted by the most painful memories of his
troubled past (e.g., remember the scene when his mother tried to kill
them in a car accident). He feels alienated from his middle‐class
friends, who do not share his experiences of poverty, addiction, and
abuse (remember the scene at a dinner table when J. D. was trying to
secure his internship). Eventually, he starts to suffer from impostor
syndrome and feels as if he “doesn't belong” to his middle‐class life
that he pursued so relentlessly. Although erasing all memory of his
childhood would obviously be an ill‐advised idea,52 J. D. might wish
to remove some of his most negative memories, which could enable
him to shake off his feeling of “inadequateness” and estrangement.
Arguably, doing so could enhance his agency and autonomy in
shaping his preferred narrative, and likely contribute to his well‐being
and psychological health (remember results of Adler's study as dis-
cussed above).
Both of the above situations are strong cases for arguing that
MMTs should also be permissible in non‐clinical cases. However, it is
possible to offer, in the context of personal agency, a radical and
general argument against memory modifications. This would apply
not only to negative memories, but to all kinds of autobiographical
memories. The argument is this: once an individual deprives herself of
given memories (or even their emotional complexion), she gives up
the opportunity to autonomously decide what she wants to
incorporate into her autobiographical narrative and overall under-
standing of who she is in the future. In other words, memory mod-
ifications may constitute points of no return as such interventions
inescapably deprive a person of “raw materials” (i.e., memories) from
which she could construct her narrative identity. Obviously, this is on
the assumption that learning about one's past from others' testi-
monies does not have the same epistemic value as the first‐personal
experience and memories.
However, the above‐discussed radical argument against the use
of MMTs seems inappropriate in the context of forgetting and re-
pressing traumatic memories—people lose content or access to
memories and this is the natural course of things, so we should not
require the person we consider autonomous to always have all the
possible material from which to build the narrative. Moreover, spe-
cific characteristics of the above discussed MMTs—that is, the ca-
pacity of optogenetics demonstrated by Nabavi et al.53 to repeatedly
deactivate and reactivate a specific memory by modifying synaptic
strengths as well as evidence that emotional aspects of adverse
memories can be relearned after reconsolidation‐based administration
of propranolol54—make the above‐mentioned radical proposition lose
its grievousness. Since the effects of both optogenetics and propra-
nolol could arguably be reversed, it precludes the problem of the
irreversible infringement of personal agency. Finally, it seems that
users of MMTs could even derive at least a certain sense of agency
from the ability to shape their memories (and, by extension, their
affective life) according to their will.55
In sum, it should be pointed out that the decision to use MMTs
should necessarily take into account the severity of symptoms and
suffering associated with recalling a given negative event and the
chance that the individual can handle them. If the patient feels (or the
doctor knows based on the most complete scientific evidence) that
she will not be able to free herself from a given traumatic memory by
conventional measures, not only mental health considerations (e.g.,
risk associated with the chance of developing PTSD), but also well‐
being and personal agency considerations may be sufficient reasons
for opting for MMTs. As we have pointed out, erasure or emotional
modification of debilitating memories may actually be the only way to
give a subject control over her life and story, thereby allowing for a
revival of meaningful narrative identity and enhancing her sense of
agency.
4 | CONCLUSIONS
We conclude with more universal considerations regarding the
emerging potential of MMTs to modify memory. As shown by, for
example, the mechanism of repression or forgetting, selective
52For an argument, see Liao & Sandberg, op. cit. note 1.
53Nabavi et al., op. cit. note 20.
54Soeter & Kindt (2011), op. cit. note 15.
55Many thanks to the anonymous reviewer who suggested this argument to us. Alter-
natively, one can argue that by deciding to tinker with her memories, a person could feel
“defeated” by her own psyche, unable to cope with her problems on her own and having to
resort to some external intervention, which could diminish her sense of agency.
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rewriting of human lives appears to be the natural propensity of our
cognitive systems, wired into our brains by evolution. Therefore, by
refining memories through neuropharmacology (e.g., propranolol,
glucocorticoids) or neurotechnology (e.g., optogenetics, PFC–rTMS),
we could acquire the means to do this more accurately and effec-
tively, providing hope to those less endowed with these kinds of
abilities by nature, and to those for whom this is impossible due to
neurological or psychiatric conditions. On the other hand, we should
be cautious when it comes to tinkering with memories, since—as
discussed above—this may have consequences for the identity,
agency, well‐being, and mental health of the person in question.
Deliberate and selective modifications of painful auto-
biographical memories become more and more possible in a clinical
setting. However, the decision to intervene cannot always be based
on purely scientific considerations, as these interventions include
several important normative aspects, such as questions about per-
sonal identity, authenticity, or autonomy. Moreover, there is still no
scientific consensus concerning the manner in which traumatic
memories should be treated as the consequences of memory mod-
ifications are still largely unknown. Furthermore, as is apparently al-
ways the case with controversial medical interventions, decisions to
interfere with a person's memory will be determined to some extent
not only by explicit ethical and scientific considerations, but also by
prevalent ideologies, such as scientific humanitarianism or transhu-
manism, which will most often be in favor of a cure, and more
traditional humanistic and religious values, which will usually be
against it.56 Therefore, if it becomes possible to modify an individual's
autobiographical memory “at will,” then the permissibility of this will
depend to a large extent on values of a dominating ideology, and be a
result of subtle social pressures and the zeitgeist.57
For example, given the more and more capitalistic mode of being
towards which our culture is heading, and having in mind how deeply
capitalism has already colonized the thinking of the modern human,
MMTs may open up a rather dystopian possibility to adjust the most
intimate contents of our minds (memories) to fulfil certain goals (e.g.,
successful careers) and norms (e.g., efficiency) via technological means for
appropriate fees. On the other hand, the concern for the truthfulness
widely discussed in neuroethical literature (see Introduction) may serve as
a counteracting force. Although, one could worry, since we live in the era
of post‐truth politics—at a time when the truth is not seen as an absolute
value but merely an instrumental one—that the truth may not matter too
much in this process.
Taking all of this into consideration, in designing future policies, we
should not only review the existing scientific knowledge regarding the
potential side effects of MMTs, but also bear in mind that decisions to
intervene in an individual's memory cannot (and will not) be based purely
on scientific considerations. Thus, the role of bio‐ and neuroethics should
be also to reveal the impact of prevailing ideologies in influencing these
decisions, analyze which values are at odds while making them, and invite
a broader audience to well‐informed discussion regarding the policy of
memory modifications, as this debate will decide whether and in what
circumstances MMT use will be allowed.
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